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Abstract
Over the past several years, Hewlett-Packard Company's North America Consumer Computing
(NACC) division has faced pressures to increase retail product variety in response to growing
customer demand. As they pursue incremental revenue and market share to meet corporate
milestones, their, product portfolio grows and the overall complexity of the business increases.
The holistic effects of this complexity across the supply chain are not fully understood, which
can lead to inefficiencies in portfolio management and, ultimately, lower profitability for the
division. Faced with this growing problem, the NACC division employed an HP internal
consulting group to help quantify the costs and benefits of complexity in their business and to
help establish decision-making guidelines to optimize future product cycles.
'This project involved three main phases: identification of complexity cost drivers in the retail
consumer PC business, development of a quantitative model to calculate complexity effects,
and suggestion of complexity guidelines for future portfolio planning. Each phase included
presentations to senior management and NACC staff as a way to build "complexity
consciousness" throughout the organization. The results show that complexity affects not only
supply chain and operational efficiency, but also marketing costs, internal accounting systems,
and organizational performance. By understanding the difference between valuable and non-
valuable variety, NACC has improved their portfolio planning and eliminated products that
hurt overall profitability.
'Thesis Supervisor: Sara Beckman
Title: Sr. Lecturer, University of California Berkeley, Haas School of Business
Thesis Supervisor: Thomas Roemer
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
The topics of complexity, variety control, portfolio management, and SKU proliferation have
generated a high level of interest in both academic and industrial arenas, and many papers have
been written about these topics. The existing studies reveal many causes and possible solutions
to product complexity, but few address the specific details of quantifying the true costs and
benefits of portfolio expansion. Fundamentally, complexity management involves identifying
and weighing the positive and negative effects of product expansion. Within large
organizations, decisions are made locally within each business function and at each stage of the
supply chain without any strong understanding of their holistic effects. Localized business
incentives and metrics drive this behavior which can ultimately lead to a decline in overall
profitability.
There is no common language to discuss complexity across an entire organization, as each
business function has its own definition of the word. To someone working in procurement,
complexity may involve a large number of suppliers who must be managed. In the factory,
complexity is driven by the number of components and final products in production and
inventory. For a product planner, complexity may involve scheduling and allocating finished
goods across multiple factories and sales channels. Each type of complexity is real and
important, but without a common language the organization as a whole can face difficulties
understanding the trade-offs between the values and costs of variety. Once a business
understands the possible effects of complexity, the next step is to quantify these values and
costs which vary greatly across different stages of the supply chain and at different points in the
product lifecycle. This data can inform future business decisions and enable profit
maximization through optimization of revenue and cost.
This thesis describes a complexity management project at Hewlett-Packard Company's North
America Consumer Computing (NACC) business involving their portfolio of retail desktop
computers. The results of the project were an analytical framework to measure holistic
complexity effects and a set of business recommendations based on the quantitative results.
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1.1 Hewlett-Packard Company Organizational Background
The Hewlett-Packard Company (HP) was founded in 1939 by Bill Hewlett and Dave Packard,
two Stanford alumni who wanted to build and sell electronic equipment. From its humble
beginnings as a supplier of electronics equipment to the government for World War II, HP has
grown dramatically into one of the largest technology companies in the world. In May of 2002,
HP merged with Compaq Corporation to strengthen its position in both consumer and business
computers. The company currently employs over 140,000 people in three different business
groups: Imaging and Personal Systems, Technology Solutions, and Customer Solutions.
Supporting these are several global functions including HP Labs and Global Operations/IT.
1.2 HP's North America Consumer Computing Business
HP's Imaging and Personal Systems Group (IPSG) has global responsibility for all of the
company's consumer and small business products, including desktop PCs, laptops, monitors,
handheld computers, digital entertainment devices, and calculators. Within IPSG, a matrix
organization divides the business unit into technology areas and geographical areas. At the
intersection of consumer PC technology and the North American region is the North American
Consumer Computing division, or NACC. This division is responsible for all desktop PCs,
laptops, and monitors sold in the United States and Canada through both retail channels and
direct customer sales. Headquartered in Cupertino, California, NACC is responsible for a large
portion of IPSG's overall profitability.
Since the merger with Compaq, HP has supported both company brands while consolidating
marketing and operations. In the consumer space, the dual brand strategy has some specific
advantages. Like a toothpaste manufacturer who offers multiple different product lines, NACC
is able to capture more retailer shelf space with its assortment of SKUs. In addition, the two
brands facilitate product differentiation: the Compaq Presario is the lower cost workhorse and
the HP Pavilion is the premium multimedia offering. Each brand has its own distinct industrial
design, including a unique suite of monitors and accessories.
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CHAPTER 2: COMPLEXITY AT NACC2
Over the past several years, NACC has faced product proliferation in their retail business and
the organization would like to better understand the costs of this added complexity. For each
sales cycle, the product marketing team generates an initial, small portfolio of stock keeping
units (SKUs) that cover a wide range of price points and technology features. These
"mainstream" configurations are shown to all of HP's retail channel partners who are free to
pick and choose which products they would like to order. Most order a subset of the
mainstream offering, but many also request custom SKUs to supplement their sales. Retailers
are constantly looking for ways to distinguish themselves from their competitors, and one
prominent method is to offer unique personal computer (PC) configurations. Figure 2-1 shows
a sample advertisement from CompUSA which offers customers an "exclusive" HP computer.
HP Pavilion Media
Center Complete
System
S , . , $ T i , .
SAVtsE $310
$181r3!q 97 $1a In-sant
Merging EntertainmentMith Savin-s
Yout PC! - $50 Price Break
$150 olMf. M.il-n Rebates
Figure 2-1: A retailer advertisement promoting a custom SKU3
Using an internal pricing model, the product marketing team can create a custom SKU with a
specific selling price. The model accounts for all expected materials, overhead, and warranty
expenses to determine overall product cost. The difference between this cost and the selling
price is the total product margin, which must be split between NACC and the retailer. The
retailer margin is usually established in advance, so NACC receives what is left, the variable
contribution margin (VCM). A simple pricing diagram is shown in Figure 2-2.
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SKU X
Figure 2-2: Basic pricing model for a retail PC4
By using this SKU pricing model, NACC can calculate the expected VCM for any new
configuration; if the number is positive, the product should generate incremental profit and help
drive business growth. In most cases, these "derivative" SKUs are added to the portfolio to
satisfy retailer requests and meet business growth and revenue targets. In any one cycle,
derivatives can cause the total number of SKUs to increase by a factor of four above the
mainstream offering. Evaluated individually, each new SKU appears to be profitable, but the
cumulative effect of this product proliferation is not clearly understood.
The back end of the consumer PC business (planning, supply chain, manufacturing) feels the
burden of these product additions and believes that they affect cost structures, organizational
performance, and execution. Without quantifying the costs of complexity, however, NACC
does not really understand the full impact of SKU proliferation on their business. Some
employees believe that the cumulative cost of adding many new products starts to outweigh the
revenue of these new SKUs. Mercer Management Consulting discusses this issue in a recent
paper entitled "Unlocking profitability in complex companies." Figure 2-3 shows their analysis
of profitability as a function of revenue with a clearly visible optimum. The pursuit of
incremental revenue comes at the expense of profitability, mainly due to the hidden costs of
complexity.
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Ct"mt titve profit
Cumnulatve revenue
Figure 2-3: MMC analysis showing profitability as a function of revenues
Faced with this problem, NACC decided to seek help from two other organizations within HP:
the Design for Supply Chain program and the Procurement Risk Management team. These
groups assembled a cross-functional team of planning, marketing, sales, finance, and consulting
staff to work on this complexity model for approximately seven months. The project resulted
in three key phases described in Table 2-1.
Phase I: Phase II: Phase III:
Modeling and Revisions and Implementation and
Impact Quantification Guidelines Support
- Identified key complexity cost - Investigated additional complexity - Refined Phase II recommendations
categories through interviews and cost categories: returns, warranty, based on feedback
data collection and organizational costs
- Developed recommended
- Developed framework to compute - Revised complexity framework complexity metrics for NACC
complexity-driven costs in each based on new investigations
category - Trained NACC team on metrics
- Developed complexity guidelines and complexity guidelines
- Used framework to evaluate cost to aid in decision making
impacts of complexity reduction for - Supported decision-making for
-the current product cycle - Summarized findings to NACC Spring '05 product roadmap as
senior management requested
- Summarized recommendations to
NACC senior management - Documented project lessons and
impact
Table 2-1: The three phases of the NACC complexity project6
Ultimately, NACC management would like to understand the costs of complexity and use that
knowledge as an input to portfolio management decisions, both strategic and tactical. In some
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cases the analysis will be used to cut SKUs from the product portfolio, but in others complexity
costs will be factored into the existing pricing structure to preserve profitability.
2.1 The Design for Supply Chain Program
The Design for Supply Chain (DfSC) team is a cross-functional, internal consulting
organization with representatives in each of HP's major business units. DfSC is based on
evidence that early decisions in the product design phase of a product can have substantial
impact on supply chain performance downstream. HP business units often engage the DfSC
team to develop statistical models, analyze historical data, and suggest design strategies to help
lower supply chain costs and achieve operational excellence. The DfSC program is managed
through HP's Global Operations and IT division and receives substantial visibility from
operations executives throughout the company.
There are six key focus areas within the DfSC program, each involving an operational strategy
that reduces supply chain costs and/or improves responsiveness. These areas are illustrated
below in Figure 2-4. Most DfSC projects address multiple operational areas; the NACC
project, for example, involved variety control along with commonality and re-use.
Variety Control Logistics Enhancement Commonality and Re-Use
Trade off supply chain costs against sales Redesign product or packaging to cut weight Make components, modules, interfaces,
impacts o determine f ature set and/or increase # per pallet platforms common ow and in future
Postponement Tax and Duty Reduction Take Back Facilitation
HP's Service
Providers
Modify product to allow process resequencing Adjust product design to enable build Product and packaging changes toreduce
and postponed differentiation location and transfer price changes reverse supply chain costs
Figure 2-4: HP's Design for Supply Chain Program focus areas7
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2.2 The Procurement Risk Management Program
A sister organization to Design for Supply Chain, the Procurement Risk Management (PRM)
team is another internal consulting group that helps HP business units to manage uncertainty.
For a high tech company like HP, there is substantial variation in component availability,
component pricing, and market demand for finished products. Using statistical techniques, the
PRM team uses historical volatility data to help HP's businesses structure purchasing contracts,
assure component supply, and optimize cost savings. Through their work, the PRM staff has
become proficient in understanding forecast accuracy, stock out costs, and component excess
liabilities. For the NACC project, PRM models were used to help quantify risk and
complexity-related costs.
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CHAPTER 3: COMPLEXITY OVERVIEW
The word "complexity" refers to a proliferation of suppliers, materials, products, processes
and/or customers that a business must manage. Some common reasons for this proliferation
include:
I. Pursuit of business growth and/or revenue targets
II. Customer requests and requirements
III. Increasing competition
IV. Outdated business practices
V. Communication barriers between business functions
Each of these drivers can force a company to make decisions that seem profitable in the short
term, but are potentially very costly in the long term.
This thesis focuses specifically on the effects of adding products, which in turn may cause the
addition of materials, suppliers and/or processes. Any changes to the product offering will
affect both revenues and costs, and the relative magnitude of those effects is the key to
understanding the complexity challenge. While revenues are fairly easy to measure, costs are
often hidden, spread out, or difficult to compute. A 2004 white paper from Arthur D. Little
summarizes the problem as follows: "The basic drivers for growth in many industries today are
diversification and expansion of product and service offerings, increased customization of
products, multiple distribution channels, differentiated service bundles, etc. All this comes at a
cost, the so-called cost of complexity."8
While most of this literature applies directly to NACC's business, there are few papers that
examine the holistic impacts of complexity across a retail supply chain; of those that do, none
describe frameworks for quantifying the effect. The existing publications offer a solid
overview of complexity, however, and address many different causes, effects, solutions, and
subtleties of this pervasive issue.
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3.1 Pursuit of Business Growth
Mercer Management Consulting describes the common pressure from senior management to
grow a business using any means necessary: "Sales, marketing, and design staff are driven to
innovate, introduce new products, acquire new customers, and enter new markets in search of
revenue growth and market share. Managers add products, brands, channels, and customers
one at a time without regard to the cumulative impact on the business as a whole."9 By
pursuing incremental revenue, a business can easily forget about the associated incremental
costs and ultimately cause a reduction in overall profitability. In some cases, a business can
still end up with SKU proliferation even when all of the costs are considered. An article from
HP's Strategic 'lanning and Modeling (SPaM) team describes a complexity reinforcing loop
that can result from costs continually outweighing profits. The loop, shown in Figure 3-1,
illustrates one main driver of SKU proliferation.
Add
SKUsy
Miss vollme target Add cost
V
' ke~elay Increase
target
Figure 3-1: A reinforcing loop caused by SKU proliferation and increasing costs °
3.2 Customer Requests and Requirements
Another main driver of product proliferation is competition at both the retailer level and the
manufacturer level. Retailers look for ways to differentiate their product offerings in an effort
to draw customers into their stores, as was the case with the CompUSA example in Figure 2-1.
A study by A.T. Kearney discusses how some retailers even require different packaging for
identical products to inhibit comparison shopping. As the sales channel becomes more
competitive, retailers are increasingly asking for more differentiating products which leads to
greater complexity for the manufacturer. 
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3.3 Increasing Competition
Competition among manufacturers also leads to complexity, as each tries to outsell the others
with a wider range of products. An article from PRTM's Insight magazine argues that
competitive pressures constantly drive businesses to expand their capabilities.'2 Because
retailer shelf space is limited, manufacturers often use product proliferation as a way to capture
more of that valuable resource. A related issue is brand proliferation which is also used to
capture space inside stores. By maintaining multiple brands, manufacturers facilitate
responsiveness to different customer segments, though doing so can lead to fragmentation and
lack of cost efficiency. One only needs to look at the toothpaste selection in any drugstore to
see the results of brand proliferation and competition-driven complexity.
3.4 Outdated Business Practices
Sometimes the problem is that business practices become outdated as companies continue to
grow, and a decision-making framework that used to work well is no longer appropriate for the
larger business. In the case of mergers and acquisitions, especially, the integration of new
brands can dramatically affect the company's planning process.13 An approval process for new
products can quickly become obsolete when new brands are introduced and the size of the
portfolio increases. One major cause of complexity-related costs is capacity (both in factories
and in the workforce). Capacity management becomes a very important issue as resource
utilization increases, and often the "old way" of making decisions will fail under the new
constraints of the business. By stepping back and questioning the existing processes, a
company can usually identify obsolete practices that need revamping.
3.5 Communication Barriers between Business Functions
Rick Hoole, a consultant with PRTM, describes how communication barriers and local
optimization can result in business complexity. He argues that "most people in large
organizations continue to wear functional hats and, as one might expect, strive for functional
excellence: as each function does what is in the best interests of its customers or internal
stakeholders, it places demands on other functions, which in turn introduces greater
18
complexity." In a large, fast moving business, people have little time to communicate across
the entire organization and develop end-to-end visibility for each product. Hoole describes
complexity as "[evolving] over time from the cumulative outcome of many seemingly
unrelated functional decisions." 14 As each function works to locally optimize its own
performance, component, SKU, and channel complexity can creep into the business.
3.6 Effects of Complexity
Experts from the Operations Management Roundtable agree that quantifying the marginal costs
of complexity is very difficult due to the hidden costs.15 Even without quantifying the effect,
however, one can think about how complexity affects each separate stage of the value chains.
In a 2004 study by Arthur D. Little, the authors identify many possible effects of complexity on
a company's return on capital employed (ROCE). A summary of these findings appears in
Figure 3-2.
Research &
Devlopm ent Procurement Conversion SlIPPlyChain Marketing Sates
G&A
pactof complexity o . . .....
* Higher Higherchange U Higher n Lo*er [
purchasing over csts hand Ling costs marketing
prices due to i Higher due to smaller spend available
loer unit inventory csts batches per
volumes N rlower learning U More effortin brandproduct
I Higher curve planning and 1 Loewer
ad ministration * Higherquaiky scheduling efficiency and I
costs control costs N Higher effectiveness
1 Higher inbounrd Higher waste inventory costs due to lack ot
logistics costs Less · More product focus
rsponsive warehousing
planning & space
control U Lover pallet/
U Ltower truck fill rate
utilisation rates U Higher
U Too many obsolescence
assets costs
Figure 3-2: Arthur D. Little
I More effort in
account
managernent
I More elffort in
order
management
I* More effort in
custome r
service
I fReduced
forseast
accuracy
findings on the effects of complexity across the value chain' 6
While the Arthur D. Little findings are fairly generic, they show that product line decisions can
lead to far-reaching effects across the value chain. If, for example, product marketing decides
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to introduce a new, low volume SKU to satisfy a particular customer, other parts of the
business may feel the pain of that action. While marketing's decision may seem independent,
there are likely interactions in other parts of the business which are driven at the portfolio level.
The structure of the company and its operations will determine the relative magnitude of the
effects in different parts of the chain.
Complexity introduces variability into a company's planning processes. Forecasting at each
stage of the supply chain becomes more difficult as components, SKUs, and retailers are
added. 7 Pooling benefits are reduced, workloads increase, and organizational attention
becomes diluted as employees have to track more information. As focus spreads, the company
becomes less effective at identifying and executing growth strategies; organizational resources
are consumed by tasks that are not targeted toward profitable growth.18
3.7 "Good" vs. "Bad" Complexity
It is important to note that complexity is not a problem if your customers are willing to pay for
it. The 2004 white paper by Arthur D. Little distinguishes the different types:
"As far as the incremental profitability that results from this added
complexity structurally compensates for the additional cost, we speak of
'good complexity.' The problem, however, is often that adding
complexity requires fundamentally adapting a company's operating
model in order to prevent the additional costs incurred exceeding the
potential financial benefits (what we call 'bad complexity')."' 9
If a company understands its true costs of product proliferation, it can use that information in
negotiations and pricing decisions. Knowing that a particular customer has historically poor
forecast accuracy, for example, may affect the terms and conditions given to them in the future.
Just as individual SKUs do not exist in vacuum, neither do retailers; therefore, game theory is
an important piece of the complexity puzzle. Competitors may respond to any product
portfolio change by trying to grab market share, even at the expense of their own short term
profitability. According to one participant in the Operations Management Roundtable, "it
makes sense to maintain variety and customization as our competitive advantage while all of
20
our peers are simplifying their offerings."20 Competitive strategy should always be considered
in complexity discussions.
3.8 Ways to Address Complexity
There are two basic ways that an organization can respond to new information about the effects
of complexity: trim the portfolio or try to cover the costs. In the first case, the business reduces
the number of components/SKUs/retailers to improve organizational agility, lower costs, and
focus on a core offering to maximize profitability. The extent of the savings will be based on
what, exactly, is cut and how those reductions affect inventory levels, responsiveness,
scheduling, and overhead costs.
In the second case, a company may decide that variety is very important for satisfying customer
needs, and that attempts to reduce complexity may have severe negative consequences on the
business. In this case, the company may try to use some of its complexity findings to adjust
prices and contract terms, influencing customers to pay for some of the complexity they are
requesting. In a highly competitive environment, these changes may still have negative effects
on market share, but they preserve the existing business processes and do not impose design
constraints on customers.
A third option is to simply continue operating the business as before, offering a full suite of
products without any changes to pricing. While this is not likely to maximize profits in the
short term, it may be necessary for strategic reasons. Armed with new knowledge about the
costs of business, a company may decide that it's willing to pay for certain levels of market
share or a presence in specific markets. The information about costs of complexity cannot be
used alone as decision making tool; instead, it should be used to inform an organization and act
as an input into the overall strategic design.
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CHAPTER 4: RETAIL CONSUMER PC BUSINESS DYNAMICS
Consumer PC companies such as Gateway, Toshiba, Sony and HP all face a very difficult retail
business climate that leaves little room for mistakes. While each of these companies has a
different strategy for growth, they all operate within the same set of market and technology
conditions. The industry can be characterized by its high degree of modularity and rapid
clockspeed.21
As the PC industry has matured, a large set of technology standards have evolved with it,
offering a simplified "plug and play" architecture for the modem desktop computer. Because
of these standards, a manufacturer can easily produce a wide range of different products by
swapping out different components. This modularity allows the manufacturer to choose from
many thousands of different component permutations to design a new PC, reducing both time
and innovation in the product design process. As competitors can easily duplicate each others'
configurations, economic theory suggests that prices gravitate toward marginal cost making
unit profitability very small. For lower end PCs this is certainly the case, forcing
manufacturers to squeeze out efficiencies from their business operations. On the higher end,
there is room for product innovation such as fancy enclosures, high performance graphics, and
additional multimedia technologies. High end PCs are usually more profitable, especially when
they are bundled with a monitor.
Product lifecycles in the consumer PC business are primarily scheduled around CPU
technology lifecycles from Intel and AMD. Because these key component suppliers are
constantly releasing new and updated products, the PC industry is forced to adopt a similar
clockspeed. In 1985, for example, Compaq beat IBM to the market with PCs based on Intel's
new 80386 chip and was able to capture a large first mover advantage.2 2 PC suppliers plan four
major product cycles each year, roughly corresponding to the four seasons, with significant
demand seasonality at back-to-school and before the winter holidays.
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4.1 NACC's Retail PC Supply Chain
NACC's retail supply chain contains more nodes than its direct supply chain, which inherently
complicates forecasting and presents the opportunity for inventory accumulation. In the direct
model, forecasting and inventory are limited to the component supply only, as completed
systems are built-to-order in response to consumer demand. In retail, however, finished goods
inventory (FGI) must be produced at the factory and shipped to retailer distribution centers
before it reaches stores and finally customers. A schematic diagram of NACC's supply chain
appears in Figure 4-1.
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Figure 4-1: HP's retail supply chain
NACC outsources component handling to a third party company that operates an inventory
hub. Retailer demand signals for PC SKUs are expanded into their bills of material and these
signals are then passed along to each of the individual component suppliers. HP specifies a
target holding level for each component, usually expressed as a relative quantity such as weeks
of supply (WOS). Suppliers are held responsible for shipping their materials to the third party
hub and paying a storage fee for inventory holdings.
Production is also outsourced to multiple original design manufacturers (ODMs) and based on
a build-to-order system. Unlike the direct model where an order represents actual demand from
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a consumer, a retail order is still based on forecasted demand from end users. By jointly
forecasting, HP can work with retailers to improve their forecasts, but they are inherently less
accurate than demand in direct channels. As downstream retailers order PCs, the ODMs pull
the required components from the inventory hub or, in some instances, from the suppliers
directly. Retailer forecasts are received well in advance of each product cycle and are updated
continuously until production. There is also a "frozen window" during which a retailer may not
increase or decrease order quantities without consent from NACC. Figure 4-2 shows a sample
timeline used in product planning.
Frozen window begins
Final retailer Start of Week n
forecast received Order arrives at retailer
Multiple retailer forecasts received for Week n Production Ship
Figure 4-2: PC forecasting, ordering, and production timeline
All of the nodes on the right side of the supply chain map in Figure 4-1 are unique to the retail
business. This sales channel is an important part of the consumer PC business, but it also adds
complexity to the business and can introduce additional demand variability and financial
liability to the company. Understanding the dynamics of retail is a critical piece of the
complexity puzzle.
4.2 Retail Structure and Challenges
Dell Incorporated is widely known for its business model that allows consumers to order PCs
directly from the supplier and completely avoid the retail supply chain. HP also sells many of
its computers through the direct channel, but there is still a large population of consumers who
want the instant gratification of seeing, feeling, and immediately owning their desktop PC. An
internal study by HP reveals that a large number of PC buyers will use the Internet to find
product reviews and technical information, but ultimately prefer to make the purchase in a
retail store. There are certainly tradeoffs to the large revenues HP generates through retail
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sales, however, including a longer supply chain, less demand pooling, reduced unit
profitability, and several additional layers of marketing complexity.
4.3 Retailer Margin and Marketing Funds
Retail PC stores provide a service to HP by holding inventory, displaying products, running
advertisements, and offering sales support. None of these services are free, however, and
retailers require various types of compensation for their work. The most basic form of
compensation is the retailer margin (so-called "hard margin") which is predetermined for each
SKU. In addition, retailers accrue additional funds for each unit they order (the "soft margin")
and this money is used to buy advertisements or preferred shelf space in the stores. All of these
funds are allocated in advance and included in HP's pricing models.
4.4 Price Protection and End of Life Funds
In the direct business, supply is generated as customer orders arrive, ensuring that no FGI
excess is ever created. In the retail business, however, demand/supply matching is not as
simple and forecasts are required to plan production. HP jointly develops forecasts with each
retailer to maximize information sharing and minimize the possibility of surprise. For
production, HP operates a build-to-order system where FGI is only built when a retailer order is
received. Unlike direct, however, these ordered units may not exactly match end customer
demand, leaving NACC with additional liability.
If a retailer orders too much product and can't sell it during the product lifecycle, NACC may
need to spend money on promotions (price cuts, mail-in rebates, etc.) to generate customer
demand. All desktop PCs in the retail channel must be sold by the end of the product cycle to
make room for the next generation of products, and incorrect forecasting of market demand can
lead to FGI excess and an expensive problem. For SKUs that are sold by multiple retailers,
NACC will cut prices across the channel and pay the retailers price protection for each unsold
unit. If the excess is limited to a single retailer, end of life funds are used instead. In either
case, NACC generates new demand but also loses profitability at the same time. Usually the
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result of forecasting errors, price protection and end of life funds are a way to force demand to
meet supply. A white paper from The Boston Consulting Group describes this practice which
is also widely used in the automotive industry to move cars out of regional dealerships.23
4.5 Returns and Warranty
All of HP's computers include both a product warranty and the ability to return the product
within a specified time period. While NACC's warranty costs are relatively independent of
sales channel, their return costs can be higher for PCs sold via retail. Many of NACC's retail
channel partners have liberal return policies for their customers, which can lead to higher return
rates to HP. Though returned units are usually refurbished and re-sold, the processing costs
usually outweigh the recovered revenue. The company keeps extensive records of all warranty
and return processing, and these data are used to continuously update internal pricing models.
4.6 Advertisements
One of the most substantial differences of the retail business is the heavy use of advertisements
to drive sales. Each week, a certain set of channel partners will feature HP products in their
newspaper and online advertising. When a product goes "on ad," the retailer offers a discount
to end customers. Historical data confirms that advertisements have a substantial impact on
weekly sales of HP products, which introduces additional demand variability into the already
short product cycles.
In advance of running an ad, retailers require a certain amount of inventory in their distribution
centers and stores to buffer for the expected demand spike; this translates into modified
production schedules on the back end to meet the retailer requirements. If HP cannot meet
those requirements, the ads may get cancelled, leading to lower than expected sales for the
given period. Advertisements at the retail level have strong implications for the whole supply
chain and drive production/logistics schedules. If HP is unable to meet a retailer's inventory
requirements prior to an ad, the cost becomes a non-linear function of the shortage amount. A
small shortage can usually be remedied by expediting product, while a larger shortage may
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cause the ad to be cancelled. Because of this complex supplier/retailer relationship, simple
models (such as newsvendor, EOQ, etc.) are not always applicable to the retail business.
Advertisements are also used in the direct business, but due to the simplified supply chain,
these ads are created by the same company that is managing production. Both Dell and HP's
direct business use advertisements to drive demand for particular configurations. While direct
ads can be used to shape demand and lower variability for certain products, retail ads are not
,directly managed by a PC supplier and can instead introduce additional demand variability if
they promote already popular configurations.
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CHAPTER 5: THE NACC COMPLEXITY FRAMEWORK
The NACC Complexity Framework was designed to help understand the hidden costs of
complexity in HP's retail consumer desktop business. It allows the user to compare two
potential product portfolios: the first, Product Line A is the "full complexity" offering that
contains all of the proposed SKUs, while the second, Product Line B, contains a reduced
complexity subset. By using this comparative approach, most of the fixed costs drop out of the
framework and the focus remains on complexity-driven effects. Product Line B is simple to
modify, causing the model to recalculate the expected revenue and cost impact of portfolio
changes.
For inputs, the Complexity Framework requires detailed information about all components,
SKUs, and retailers, as each contributes to the overall business complexity. These inputs are
combined with certain operational policies employed by NACC and, based on these data, the
model calculates the effects of complexity in the five different categories shown in Figure 5-1.
These areas were identified by the cross-functional complexity team and supported by
employee interviews within the Consumer PC business.
Production Cycle \
Ramp Production End-of-lfe
ost Cycle I
Support >
Production Part Inventory
Ramp Costs 'Costs
· FGI Inventory · Component i ventory · Excess component
holding holding liability
* Lost sales * Component s ock
from late outs leading to lost
production sales
· Lost flexibility
from early
production .Marketing Fund Costs
Use of marketing funds to drive demand and
deplete xcess channel inventories
Support Costs
- Cost of supporting returns and warranty programs
Organizational Costs
· Impact on business performance from stretched resources
Figure 5-1: Complexity-driven costs across the product lifecycle24
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Additional cost areas including procurement economies of scale and service component
inventories were also investigated but were small in magnitude and therefore excluded from the
Complexity Framework. For the former, global procurement handles purchasing of many
materials for all of HP, and the effect of component choice within NACC is not significant
enough to alter pricing structures. In the case of service components for PCs, interface
commonality and functional equivalence reduces the number of different parts that HP must
hold. For example, a nine month old hard drive that fails under warranty can be replaced by a
newer model, eliminating the need to hold both in inventory. Other businesses within HP, such
as printers, do not share this level of functional equivalence and are more concerned with
service component inventories.
A schematic of the inputs, calculations, and outputs of the Complexity Framework is shown in
Figure 5-2 with each box representing a different spreadsheet in the model workbook.
I Inputs
I _
Model Analytics
Figure 5-2: Complexity framework schematic
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5.1 Framework Inputs
To properly calculate each of the complexity-related costs, detailed information about
components, SKUs, and retailers is needed. Table 5-1 shows a simplified list of model inputs;
a comprehensive listing of inputs and outputs appears in Appendix B. Of these inputs, the
expected variable contribution margin for each SKU is perhaps the most important, as that
number is closely linked to key business performance metrics and goals.
For each component Order lead time
Cost to HP
SKU allocation
Inventory holding policy (weeks of stock)
Excess salvage value (% of cost)
For each SRKU Manufacturing facility allocation
Expected net revenue ($/unit)
Expected variable contribution margin ($/unit)
Expected lifetime volume
Eligibility for price protection
For each retailer SKU allocation
Return rates (historical)
Marketing fund liability (historical)
Demand forecast information SKU forecast CVs as a function of volume (historical)
Retailer order lead time/frozen window
Week-to-week demand correlation
Factory volume and NPI capacities
Inventory production costs Supplier holding cost (% per year)
Shortage cost multiplier
Early production penalty ($/unit)
Late production penalty ($/unit)
Other inputs Organizational "costs" of complexity
Return logistics devaluation costs
Table 5-1: Complexity framework inputs
5.2 Framework Analytics and Complexity Modeling
Based on the set of portfolio inputs, the Complexity Framework uses statistical calculations,
empirical business data, and historical performance information to quantify the effects of
complexity reduction for a particular case. There are three main types of complexity in
NACC's business:
I. Component complexity (number of components, number of suppliers, etc.)
II. SKU complexity (configurations, factory allocations, etc.)
III. Retailer complexity (number of retailers, forecasting, terms of sale, etc.)
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Of these three, the first two fall within the realm of Design for Supply Chain and are the easiest
to affect via product portfolio management. The third, which involves the dynamics and costs
associated with particular retailers, is the result of NACC's strategic business model and not
directly tied to the product offering. Nonetheless, because retailer requests and behaviors drive
certain costs, they were included in our model to provide additional insight. Specifically, past
retailer performance was used to show that some accounts are more costly than others. These
retailer-specific effects highlight some potential cost accounting issues that may impact
strategic decisions in the future.
5.3 Complexity and SKU-level Forecast Accuracy
For each desktop PC configuration created, the NACC product planning team must determine
both short-term and long-term volume forecasts. Weekly production estimates are needed for
commodity procurement (hard drives, memory, etc.) and factory production scheduling. In
addition, lifetime volume forecasts are required for procuring long lead-time components (such
as chasses) and also for predicting overall revenue and profit for each SKU. As more SKUs are
added to the product portfolio, the average volume per SKU tends to decline, which leads to
increased demand variability.2 5 Historical demand data from NACC also supports this
assertion. Because HP's ODMs manufacture using a build-to-order system, demand variability
presents few problems at the FGI level. On the component level, however, these variations
force increases in the levels of safety stock and inventory holding.
For components that are used in a small number of parent SKUs, the lack of demand pooling
can lead to stock outs or inventory excess situations which are even more costly. Just as
demand for PC configurations is normally distributed, so is the demand for all components.
For a common part shared across multiple SKUs, demand variability will be reduced due to
pooling effects. While demand for one SKU increases, demand for another that shares the
same part is equally likely to decrease (assuming negative demand correlation, which is a fair
assumption for the retail PC industry). For unique parts that are only used in a single SKU,
.however, there is no opportunity for this variability reduction and the component's demand will
exactly match that of its parent SKU. Unless safety stock levels are increased for these unique
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parts, their service level will be statistically lower than that of most common parts, thereby
leading to an increased probability of stock out or excess at the end of a cycle.26
In the NACC Complexity Framework, historical PC demand and sales data from previous
product cycles were combined with employee interviews to estimate volume-based variability.
SKUs were grouped into four different categories based on forecasted lifetime volume (low,
medium, high, very high) and representative coefficients of variation (CVs) were assigned to
each. The modeled CVs came from NACC's historical data of demand variations over the
order frozen window. Component procurement is managed on a weekly basis, however, so the
model converts multi-week CVs into weekly variances for each SKU. Though the actual units
shipped each week vary widely over the product lifecycle, the coefficients of variation are
considerably more stable.
5.4 Complexity and Component Inventory Holding Costs
Most desktop PC components have order lead times that extend outside the retailer order frozen
window, which can lead to a delayed response in the supply chain. For example, if a retailer
cancels a SKU order at the last possible moment, many of the components for that SKU are
likely in transit already due to their long lead times. As new components are added, demand
volatility increases and the cost of delayed responses increases as supply no longer matches
expected demand. Many companies will address demand variability by increasing safety stock
levels, but in certain high tech industries, the holding cost of this extra inventory can be 60-
80% per year.
The amount of inventory holding for a particular component is tightly linked to the demand
variability of all SKUs that include that component. Product proliferation can lead to opposing
effects on component inventory, however. As the number of PC configurations increases, there
may be inventory savings through component pooling, but at the same time, the high demand
variability of these new SKUs may offset any pooling benefits. The ultimate effect of
complexity on component inventory holding costs could be positive or negative depending on
the specific details of the portfolio.
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The specific characteristics of an additional SKU and its affects on the portfolio determine the
net effect on component inventories. In the ideal case, a new SKU offering completely
incremental volume (i.e., no cannibalization of other SKUs) and no new components is
introduced. Here, assuming no correlation, the demand variability for each component in the
new SKU will be reduced from the increased pooling across the portfolio. In the worst case, a
fuilly cannibalizing SKU with all unique parts is introduced. Under this scenario, the demand
fbor other SKUs will decline, thereby lowering portfolio forecast accuracy and service levels.
Also, the introduction of new components with no demand pooling will increase inventory
holding costs. These extreme cases do not occur in practice, however, and the holistic effect of
new SKUs on component inventory cost, hence the need for a detailed analytical model
Component inventory levels in the hub were modeled using the standard cycle stock/safety
stock approach. By expanding the demand for each desktop SKU into demand for all
components, an average weekly volume was determined for each component in the portfolio.
Assuming weekly orders, the safety stock level is the total weeks of inventory at the hub less
one half a week of cycle stock. A sample inventory level schematic is shown in Figure 5-3.
For the holding cost calculation, the model assumes demand is evenly divided across the 13
weeks of the product lifecycle, which is a highly conservative assumption.
Inventory
Cycle Stock
\~nKK KKKK
Safety Stock
Week
Figure 5-3: Component inventory level over the product lifecycle
Combining this inventory model with a material holding rate, a component holding cost
firmula was derived. The model calculates a total inventory holding cost for each component
in NACC's product portfolio. By outsourcing control of the materials hub, suppliers pay this
holding cost, but these expenses are passed back to HP through component pricing. Dell also
operates a similar system with their use of inventory revolvers and third party replenishment.2 8
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5.5 Complexity and Component Shortage
While component inventory holding costs are certainly important, the costs of stock outs can be
substantially higher if they cause FGI shipment delays to retailers. If the demand for a
particular desktop PC greatly exceeds the forecast, HP faces the prospect of component
shortage. With enough notice, HP can sometimes alter production schedules to minimize
shortage effects, but responding to large demand surprises is a constant challenge.
Component service level is tightly linked to commonality: components used across many
different SKUs receive demand pooling benefits that increase availability. Figure 5-4
illustrates how demand pooling improves forecast accuracy, which ultimately leads to a higher
service level for a given inventory policy. In this example, the component with high demand
pooling has a higher lower service level than the component with the low demand pooling,
even though both have the same inventory holding level (two weeks of supply). When
components aren't available, production schedules can slip leading to lost sales.
High demand pooling
Low demand pooling
)st Sales
2 WOS 2 WOS
Figure 5-4: Effect of demand pooling on component stock outs
The second key service level driver is the component inventory policy. Increasing safety stock
levels can buffer against demand uncertainty, but this leads to higher holding costs and an
increased risk of excess. Certain components are also subject to rapid devaluation, supplier
price drops, and/or technological obsolescence, so HP tries to minimize its inventory exposure
on these items. The least expensive way to improve forecast accuracy and therefore increase
service levels is to share components across SKUs wherever possible.
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The Complexity Framework uses the order lead time demand variability and inventory policy
for each component to calculate its expected Type I and Type II service levels. The Type I
level, a measure of stock out frequency, is calculated from the normal demand distribution
curve for each component as shown in Figure 5-5. The cumulative area to the left of the
''Safety Stock" line is the Type I service level. Mathematically, the Type I service level is the
cumulative probability of lead time demand exceeding the available inventory.
Safety
Stock
Figure 5-5: Graphical illustration of the Type I service level
The actual cost of a stock out, however, is highly dependent on the magnitude of the shortage; a
single missing component is much less of a problem than several hundred missing components.
The Type II service level incorporates the magnitude of shortage, making it more appropriate
for calculating shortage cost. For modeling simplicity, a closed form approximation of the
Type II service level was used.29 The impact of a component stock out is inversely
proportional to its Type II service level. When a component is unavailable, HP is unable to
substitute parts and produce the PC; therefore, the opportunity cost is the VCM of the whole
computer. The Complexity Framework calculates a weighted average VCM for the entire
portfolio. The model also assumes that the probability of multiple, simultaneous component
stock outs is zero (for example, a missing hard drive and a missing memory module when the
factory goes to build a particular SKU).
5.6 Complexity and Component Excess/Obsolescence
Just as component underage can impact profitability through lost sales, component overages
can present a costly problem at the end of a product lifecycle. If SKU-level demand drops off
at the end of a cycle, HP can find itself with excess components, many of which are
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depreciating at a very rapid rate. Excess exposure is the primary reason why high safety stock
levels for expensive components (such as CPUs) are kept to a bare minimum. Over time, HP
has reduced its excess and obsolescence substantially to the point where it is no longer
considered a problem. While some of the improvement came from dynamic adjustment of
inventory policies, a large portion is due to better management of the leftover materials.
HP can often use excess components in future products, thereby reducing their inventory write-
offs. Some of the "slow-clockspeed" materials such as mice and keyboards are relatively
simple to transfer, whereas "fast-clockspeed" components such as processors and video cards
quickly become obsolete and are harder to sell in subsequent cycles.3 0 By negotiating with
retailers to buy SKUs containing older technology, HP's sales team can reduce excess
inventory, but possibly at the expense of PC margin on those units. This is another hidden cost
of complexity that can reduce NACC's overall profitability.
In the Complexity Framework, component excess costs are modeled using a series of
conservative salvage value estimates. For each component, it is assumed that any excess
material is caused by cancelled orders during the final shipment lead time plus any buffer
inventory that already existed in the hub. Using the previously calculated component demand
variances, the model computes the demand mean and standard deviation for each component
over its order lead time.
The Complexity Framework uses the inventory policy and order lead time demand variability
for each component to calculate the expected excess levels. As with a stock out, the magnitude
of excess is very important and directly correlates to liability cost. By calculating a weighted
average for all of the different overage scenarios, the model determines an expected excess
quantity for each component. Multiplying this quantity by the loss rate from reselling the extra
components gives an overall expected excess cost for each component. As expected,
components shared across multiple SKUs are less susceptible to overages than unique
components.
36
:5.7 Complexity and Production Ramp
At the start of each product lifecycle, HP must manufacture and ship a very large volume of
product to fill the channel in advance of the selling season. Because retail sales are highly
driven by advertisements, NACC must ensure that retailers have a sufficient supply of PCs
before an ad will run. Production ramp is the period where HP's ODMs face extreme capacity
limitations as they try to manufacture all of the different SKUs.
Ideally, HP could schedule all of their factories to produce all of their SKUs immediately
before the retailer advertisements are distributed. During the main portion of the
manufacturing cycle this is usually not a problem, but capacity limitations at the start of
production make this goal very difficult to achieve. Specifically, each factory has two
important constraints that can become binding during manufacturing ramp. The first constraint
is total weekly production volume which is related to the size, number of production lines,
available labor, and productivity rates at each production facility. The second constraint is the
number of new product introductions per week which is limited by the quality and engineering
verification staff available for each new SKU.
As SKUs are added to each business cycle, they are allocated to factories for production ramp.
In the ideal case, HP produces all of its new computers in a short window prior to the first
advertisement. This so-called "optimal window" is the least expensive and most flexible
option, as HP only incurs a small FGI holding cost for the units produced. As products
proliferate, however, the factories start to reach their weekly capacity limits (either volume or
NPI) and the optimal window fills up.
Faced with a fixed delivery date, NACC is then forced to start production ramp for some
products before the optimal window. These "early" SKUs face additional FGI holding costs
and increased depreciation as they sit in storage; assembled PCs depreciate faster than
components. In addition, HP is producing these PCs with less information about expected
nlmarket performance and competitor offerings, so they risk producing a non-competitive
product. A separate study within NACC determined the opportunity cost of early production
which was used as an input in the Complexity Framework.
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Because of reduced competitiveness and lack of market information, NACC limits how early
they will produce any given SKU; before a certain point, there is insufficient data to launch a
new product. Like the optimal window, this "early window" can fill with new products, as
well. With both the optimal and early windows filled, production for certain products is
delayed until after the original ad date. The extent of the late production determines the cost: a
small delay can result in lost sales, while a large delay can cause retailers to cancel
advertisements, which affects multiple HP products. Figure 5-6 shows a schematic of the
production ramp windows and their associated cost categories. In practice, the length of the
early window is determined by group consensus within NACC and depends on factors such as
new technology availability, competitor information, and factory capacity schedules.
Early Production
Products built
early to reduce
factory crowding
Optimal Window
Products built in a
narrow window prior
to the ad
Late Production
Overcrowding
causes delays
Target
Ad Date
Financial impact:
FGI holding cost
Competitive "cost"
FGt holding cost Lost sales "cost" I
Figure 5-6: Production ramp scheduling windows
Each SKU in the Complexity Framework is assigned a production facility and an expected
lifetime volume. The model allocates ramp production at each facility by first filling the
optimal window, then scheduling early production, and finally postponing any remaining
volume. Instead of using a linear optimization, the model uses factory allocations (a user input)
to determine which facilities will hit ramp capacity constraints. The model then performs the
series of logical arguments shown in Figure 5-7 to allocate production and calculate the total
ramp complexity cost. In practice, this factory scheduling is handled by NACC's planning
team which tries to optimally distribute SKUs for production ramp.
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Figure 5-7: Factory allocation model
Based on these simplified allocations, the Complexity Framework will output the percentages
of optimal, early, and postponed production for both Product Line A (full complexity) and
Product Line B (reduced complexity). The model also provides factory-level utilization data
for both product lines. Sample output data is shown in Figure 5-8. In the bar graph, Product
Line B has a higher percentage of products produced in the optimal window because there are
fewer NPIs and therefore less factory crowding.
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Figure 5-8: Portfolio- and factory-level utilization outputJ3
5.8 Complexity and Organizational Performance
An article from the Wharton School of Business offers the following insight about how
complexity affects organizations:
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"Highly motivated individuals often add task upon task upon task to their
responsibilities, but eventually they become dysfunctional because they
try to do too many things with too little time to do any of them well.
Organizations are vulnerable to the same creeping malaise. Complexity,
or clutter, eats away at profits by diverting scarce resources and by
masking true profitability."32
While the link between portfolio complexity and employee workload may seem intuitive,
quantifying that effect is certainly not. Many NACC employees agree that forecasting,
scheduling, monitoring and executing new products grows increasingly difficult as the portfolio
expands, but the impact on business performance is difficult to express in dollars. Recently,
HP tried to capture these costs through an activity-based costing (ABC) model which allocated
employee salaries and overhead to various cost drivers. Initially, our complexity team decided
to utilize those ABC results as an input into our model, using the number of components,
SKUs, factories, and product platforms as the key drivers for organizational cost.
Original calculations using the ABC data showed a very small dependence on complexity
because most of the organizational elements (people, factories, etc.) are fixed costs. ABC
analysis allocates a fixed set of resources to various cost drivers, but it doesn't capture
opportunity costs or the effects of complexity on the quality and efficiency of individual
performance. A white paper by A.T. Kearney confirms this point, explaining that "a deep
understanding of cost behavior-both for current costs and under potential scenarios-gives a
platform from which to estimate the resulting effects on profitability levels. This requires both
tools and thought that transcend traditional activity-based costing."33
Quantifying the total organizational impact of complexity is very challenging because many of
the effects involve opportunity costs that are inherently difficult to measure. The first step is to
identify specific organizational performance issues and missed opportunities that scale with
business complexity. Table 5-2 shows the key impact areas uncovered from employee
interviews. For each of these areas, NACC managers estimated both the critical SKU count
thresholds where problems start to occur and the cost magnitudes of those issues: below a
certain complexity level, organizational effects are negligible, but above, costs start to increase
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dramatically. While SKU count is certainly not the only driver of organizational performance
issues, it is a reasonable proxy for business complexity that resonates with most employees.
Complexity Effect Organizational Cause
Reduction in forecast accuracy Reduced focus and organizational learning
Lost sales opportunities Slower organizational responsiveness and flexibility
Rework and materials Increased quality escapes and recovery efforts
rebalancing
Productivity losses Less effective training, lower job satisfaction, attrition, lost
time in meetings, lower cross-functional understanding
Errors and non-compliance issues Reduced focus on collecting rebates, negotiating materials
prices, and enforcing rules of engagement
Table 5-2: Effects of complexity on organizational performance 34
The estimated organizational impact, expressed in dollars, was substantially larger than an
ABC analysis would suggest due to the inclusion of opportunity costs in the analysis. In the
Complexity Framework, these cost figures were cut by a factor of four to remain conservative.
For some SKUs, however, even these reduced estimates are enough to strip away most or all of
the expected profitability.
5.9 Complexity and Marketing Fund Liability
As the number of PC configurations increases in a given product cycle, the average
volume/SKU declines and overall forecast accuracy is reduced. While HP faces the component
inventory consequences of this variability, retailers must also deal with the FGI implications.
Specifically, forecasting end user demand becomes more difficult, ultimately pushing retailers
to hold higher inventory either at their distribution centers or in their stores. From the retailer
perspective, the optimal order quantity is determined using a Newsvendor-type approach where
the cost of overage is weighed against the cost of underage.
A SKU stock out would cause the retailer to lose not only the margin from the computer sale,
but also the margin from any other items that may be purchased with the PC. This is mainly a
problem when the configuration is advertised and on sale; at other times, the retailer can often
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substitute with a different model or a competing brand. With the opposite problem of excess
inventory at the end of a cycle, the retailer can ask NACC for help in creating new customer
demand through price cuts or additional advertisement. Depending on the specific terms and
conditions of each SKU, the assistance will either come in the form of price protection dollars
or "end of life" dollars. Each retailer will bear some of the FGI overage cost through reduced
margin. NACC, which has a financial interest in making sure the channel is empty at the end
of each cycle, will bear the remaining cost.
HP's marketing dollars lower the cost of overage for the retailer, which can lead to increased
orders and a supply/demand imbalance at the end of each cycle. The problem intensifies as
retailers order more different SKUs; as they are no longer pooling demand, variability
increases. Historical data confirms the link between retailer SKU count and NACC's
marketing fund expenditures. Regression analysis was used to identify the primary factors that
drive marketing expense. The results showed that the most significant cost driver for price
protection and end of life payments is the overall PC market forecast "surprise." Each cycle,
NACC forecasts market growth or shrinkage and adjusts sales targets appropriately. If NACC
predicts that market will grow more than it actually does, retailers are often left with extra
inventory. If instead the growth predictions come in short of reality, there will be very little
leftover FGI at the end of the cycle.
The analysis of historical marketing fund data revealed two primary insights. First, there are
significant variations among retailers that are not included in the current pricing model. At the
beginning of each cycle, the NACC finance team estimates and allocates a certain percentage of
revenue to cover price protection and end of life payment. This is an aggregate sum and not
allocated to individual products. In the Complexity Framework, each custom SKU is assigned
an expected marketing cost based on the purchaser's historical performance. For example, a
SKU being considered for Circuit City would be assigned a baseline percentage consistent with
that retailer's historical average over the past six product cycles. For mainstream SKUs sold by
multiple retailers, the baseline is set to zero as a conservative estimate that will never over-
estimate the cost effect.
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The second insight from the historical data deals with the number of price protected SKUs sold
by each retailer. Regression analyses showed that price protected SKU count is a significant
driver of marketing fund liability, so the model calculates retailer-level effects, as well. Using
a conservative coefficient from the regression analyses, the Framework assigns additional cost
to each retailer for every price protected SKU it will sell. Because this cost is calculated as a
percentage of total retailer revenue, it must be aggregated at the portfolio level and cannot be
assigned to individual SKUs.
5.10 Complexity and Product Return/Warranty Cost
Every time a PC is sold to a retailer, NACC holds aside a small percentage of its revenue to
cover expected returns and warranty expense. HP offers an extensive support package for all of
its products and must cover the costs of labor, logistics, and materials processing for both
retailers and end customers. These costs can vary widely with retailer behavior and product
quality, factors that may be linked to overall business complexity.
Warranty transactions, which occur directly between end customers and HP, involve services
such as telephone support, hardware repair, and sometimes even product exchanges. As
additional SKUs are added to the portfolio and factory utilization increases, there are more
opportunities for quality problems. MacDuffie et al. (1996) reviewed a variety of studies from
the automotive industry that confirm a link between complexity and lower product quality.3
These manufacturing problems can lead to increased warranty expenses after the products are
sold. HP tracks warranty "events" such as support calls, escalations, exchanges, and labor
minutes for each SKU, and uses this information to estimate expense for future products.
Product returns occur when retailers send units back to HP. In most cases, the returned units
come from end customers, but a small percentage is due to retailer inventory rebalancing. All
returns are processed through a reverse supply chain where they are either refurbished or de-
branded before being re-sold. NACC recovers a portion of the returns cost through a retailer
restocking fee, though most products will sell below their cost of materials by the time they
reach the end of the returns supply chain.
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Analysis of historical returns data shows that return rates vary widely among retailers and
depend on numerous factors, including customer returns policies, in-house refurbishment
capabilities, and the number of SKUs sold in a given cycle. Therefore, some return costs are
attributable to SKU complexity, while others vary due to specific retailer behavior. In addition,
certain SKUs have higher logistics, processing, and resale costs due to particular characteristics
(size, composition, age, etc.).
In NACC's SKU pricing model, warranty and returns costs are allocated together as a single
expected liability. Based on historical data, these estimated costs are very accurate on the
aggregate level, but the cost allocation at the SKU level is based on a basic formula that
excludes certain cost drivers. For the warranty component, the Complexity Framework uses
the existing allocations which are calculated from large quantities of historical data. For the
returns component, however, the model calculates an expected cost using the basic formula
shown in Equation 1.
Return Cost = Return Accruals - Restocking Fees +
[(Retailer Return Rate * Units Sold) * (Lost VCM + Logistics Cost + Loss on Resale)]
Equation 1: Model calculation of return cost
For each SKU, the total return cost is a direct function of the number of units returned, which is
highly dependent on retailer policies. Aside from the various accruals/fees assessed for each
unit, NACC also covers the logistics costs and the loss from reselling the unit after processing.
These effects can be estimated for each SKU given its volume, retailers, and components.
The Complexity Framework compares the modeled costs to those allocated in the pricing
model and calculates an expected delta for each SKU. The model suggests that the costs for
certain configurations/retailers are over allocated in the current pricing model, while for other
configurations/retailers the costs are under allocated. The weighted average of all deltas across
the entire portfolio is 0 (in agreement with aggregate accounting), but the differences for an
individual SKU can be significant.
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CHAPTER 6: MODELING RESULTS AND INSIGHTS
Starting from NACC's complete product line, the Complexity Framework can dynamically
calculate the cost effects of adding, eliminating or consolidating SKUs. When a product is
removed from the portfolio, its components, production factory, and retailer(s) are affected by
the change. By quantifying the dollar impact of the change across each cost category, the
model can distinguish between productive and non-productive complexity reduction. Figure
6-1 shows a sample of productive simplification where the expected value of cost savings is
larger in magnitude than the expected drop in revenue; as a result, the total volume contribution
margin (VCM) increases.
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Figure 6-1: Model output showing the value of complexity reduction 3 6
The leftmost vertical bar shows NACC's total expected contribution margin from offering all
of its proposed products (i.e., the "full complexity" offering). Removing products from the
portfolio will cause a drop in total VCM, but the magnitude of that decrease depends on the
level of cross-SKU cannibalization. As the second vertical bar shows, the effect is minimized
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when all demand for the canceled products shifts over to non-canceled alternatives. If no
cannibalization exists, then NACC will lose all of the VCM from the canceled products and
possibly also VCM from other connected products such as monitors. The Complexity
Framework conservatively assumes that each SKU provides incremental volume and that
demand for cancelled configurations is not transferred to other products. The third vertical bar
shows the new VCM total for the simplified portfolio, which is the delta between the first two
bars.
If all costs were captured in NACC's pricing model, then these first three bars would tell the
whole story; if the business doesn't foresee any benefits, there would be no reason to consider
variety control. The Complexity Framework models the entire supply chain, however, and
shows that eliminating SKUs can offer multiple types of financial benefit. The light grey bars
in Figure 6-1 show the expected cost savings in each of the five cost categories: manufacturing
ramp, component inventories, marketing liability, organizational performance, and
returns/warranty. When these savings are added into the analysis, they outweigh the lost
margin and suggest that cutting SKUs can improve overall profitability.
Not all complexity reduction scenarios yield a profit increase like the one shown in Figure 6-1,
however. A series of different scenarios were simulated to develop intuition about the
differences between "good" and "bad" complexity. The main goal was to identify certain SKU
characteristics (volume, VCM, etc.) that correlate to bad complexity. This information could
then be used in future portfolio planning activities and hopefully flag those proposed SKUs that
are likely to be unprofitable.
Unfortunately, NACC does not have the luxury of planning a whole product portfolio at one
time. Instead, the initial mainstream offering is amended and altered over many weeks in
response to retailer requests and new market information. The Framework relies on portfolio-
level analysis to calculate costs, and while its level of detail is important for understanding
complexity, it is not an appropriate tool for incremental decisions. Therefore, the model was
used to simulate many different scenarios and from those trials, a simplified set of complexity
guidelines was created.
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6.1 Complexity Guidelines
Without full knowledge of the entire product portfolio, NACC needed a way to evaluate each
;SKU individually while still considering some of the higher order effects. The results from
Complexity Framework simulations were analyzed and a series of guidelines were extracted
from the data. By knowing the order of magnitude of different types of complexity effects,
NACC could make better decisions about proposed SKU introductions. The guidelines
illustrate costs not visible in the current pricing model which include component-, SKU-, and
retailer-level effects:
Complexity Cost Adjustments3 7
(specific values are confidential)
Organizational and manufacturing impacts:
- If the portfolio contains 35-40 SKUs: add $A
- If the portfolio contains 40-45 SKUs: add $A + $B per unit
- If the portfolio contains 45-50 SKUs: add $C + $B per unit
- If the portfolio contains >50 SKUs: add $C + $D per unit
Inventory / shortage costs:
- If the SKU contains unique components (that are not excess from a previous cycle):
add E% of the unique component cost per unit
Price protection, EOL, return and warranty costs:
- Base PP+EOL costs not captured in pricing model: add F% of projected SKU
revenue
- For SK;Us sold to retailer X or Y: subtract $G/unit for returns over-allocation
- For all other SKUs, return costs not captured in pricing model: add H% of selling
price - $I (from regression analysis)
- Increase in returns costs from SKU addition: add J% of total retailer revenue
- If the SKU is a price protected derivative: add K% of total retailer revenue
These "rules of thumb" are not absolute, but offer conservative estimates of hidden complexity
costs. To facilitate the evaluation of proposed SKUs, a simplified calculator was built in Excel
to assist the product marketing team. A screenshot of this tool is shown in Figure 6-2.
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Figure 6-2: SKU-level profitability calculator using simplified complexity guidelines
SKUs sold as bundles (PC plus monitor) inherently have a higher contribution margin than
standalone SKUs, which complicates the process of direct comparison. To address this
problem, the calculator uses historical data about monitor connect rates to determine an
expected contribution from each standalone PC sold. Under this setup, the bundled PCs (which
are thought to be more profitable) are accurately compared with the standalone offerings.
The simplified calculator reveals some basic intuition about complexity effects. First, there are
certain baseline costs related to the total portfolio size which can quickly offset the revenue
from a marginal SKU. These include the costs of capacity, organizational burden, and
expected marketing expenditures. In addition, certain costs scale with volume while others are
relatively volume-insensitive. This suggests that a low volume SKU with high margins is
different from a high volume SKU with low margins, even though the "expected" total profit
may be identical. Finally, there are retailer-level effects (marketing liability, returns costs, etc.)
which, in aggregate, can destroy profitability at current price points. All of these effects are
important to understand early in the planning process so that NACC can incorporate them into
the strategic decision making process.
The simplified complexity guidelines were applied to the proposed SKUs in an upcoming
product cycle to predict the "true" profitability of each offering. Illustrated in Figure 6-3, the
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data suggests that, when all costs are considered, there are eight SKUs with expected negative
contribution margin. These "red zone" SKUs should be the target of further inquiry to
understand why they are likely to cost so much and what strategic options (price changes,
configuration adjustments, minimum volume requirements, cancellations, etc.) should be
considered. The analysis suggests that these underperforming SKUs will cost NACC
significantly more than the revenue they are expected to generate. Figure 6-3 shows the
expected cost/value of removing each SKU from the portfolio assuming that only one product
is removed at a time. If multiple products are removed, there may be portfolio-level effects
which are not included in this simplified model.
F _ __ .~Predicted VCM (as % of revenue) vs. SKU
5
'o
0%0! , I 10 20 30 40
SKU
Figure 6-3: Predicted VCM as a percent of revenue for each SKU in a proposed portfolio
These guidelines serve two main purposes: to reveal hidden costs and to highlight allocation
subtleties. The first deals with organizational issues and effects that exist outside the
organization, usually deep in the supply chain. The second is essentially a form of activity-
based costing that includes cost drivers at the component, SKU, and retailer level. As with any
ABC system, the outputs of the model are meant to highlight opportunities for improvement.
Cooper and Kaplan (1988) emphasize this point:
"Activity-based costing is not designed to trigger automatic decisions. It
is designed to provide more accurate information about production and
support activities and product costs so that management can focus its
attention on the products and processes with the most leverage for
increasing profits. It helps managers make better decisions about
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product design, pricing, marketing, and mix, and encourages continual
operating improvements." 38
By understanding these issues, NACC can gain a new perspective on its business and assess
future opportunities with a new, quantified understanding of complexity. As this information
was presented, it started to diffuse through the different functional groups, including the senior
management team. The complexity guidelines could be used to influence product portfolio
decisions, but they still did not address some of the more fundamental performance issues in
the group. To fully address complexity, NACC would need to continuously monitor its
performance over time and make dynamic changes as needed.
6.2 Complexity Metrics
In the spirit of organizational learning and continuous improvement, NACC also requested a set
of metrics which they could use to highlight complexity effects and track overall business
performance. The proposed tracking information falls into four major categories:
Forecast Accuracy:
Calculate historical accuracy
Track future performance
Marketing & Returns:
Track marketing fund spending by retailer and SKU
Planning & Production:
Monitor factory performance and any delay causes
Components:
Analyze inventory levels
Identify opportunities for commonality
Some of these categories will provide direct useful information to NACC, while others will
offer refinements to parameters included in the Complexity Framework.
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CHAPTER 7: IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPLEXITY REDUCTION
The modeling results from the Complexity Framework were presented to NACC senior
management and representatives from all groups within the business (marketing, sales, supply
chain, planning, etc.). Most people intuitively understood that complexity can impair overall
business performance, but NACC had never been able to quantify the magnitude of the effect.
Because the model was constantly validated by people in the business and all estimates were
highly conservative, NACC management looked at the complexity as an opportunity for
improvement.
7.1 Challenges and Opportunities
Because the business operates under certain constraints from HP executives, other HP
businesses, and various corporate partners, some of the complexity recommendations provided
interesting information but were unlikely to affect overall strategy. Most of the findings,
however, were both relevant and within the decision power of the group. There was extensive
discussion about individual retailers and their historical behavior, including their policies,
requests, and overall cost to serve. In the consumer PC business, there are multiple metrics
used to evaluate the health of different suppliers. Market share, revenue, and gross margin are
all used both internally and externally as measures of success, but each of these can be
optimized at the expense of the others. For example, HP can increase its market share by
slashing prices, but overall gross margins will suffer as a result. The complexity analysis
results were therefore viewed with the understanding that some business decisions are strategic
in nature and may actually hurt the bottom line, at least in the short term.
From an organizational standpoint, each part of the NACC business has its own set of metrics
and incentives. While the people in the back end (manufacturing, supply chain, logistics) are
evaluated on cost, those in the front (marketing, sales) are rewarded for generating revenue.
Successful complexity reduction works by lowering costs faster than revenues, thereby
increasing overall profit. Because NACC divisions are not measured on profit (doing so would
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be difficult), complexity reduction will have different impacts on each group. For those in the
back end, reducing complexity will lower costs which will improve their overall metrics. The
associated drop in revenue, however, will make the front end groups appear to be performing
worse, even though the overall business is more profitable.
Ideally, NACC management is looking for ways to reduce complexity and recover some of the
lost revenue by improving the value of the remaining products. Theoretically, if the business
can increase its overall profitability by offering fewer SKUs, some of that profit can be
leveraged to improve sales. The Complexity Framework assumes that all sales are incremental
and that cannibalization is a negligible effect, but that may not actually be true. If NACC can
successfully transfer demand from cancelled SKUs to other offerings, then the value of
complexity reduction would increase substantially.
7.2 Stages of Implementation
The complexity project is a major undertaking with both short and long term goals. In the short
term, NACC needs to understand the realities of complexity and many of the costs that are
hidden among departments, SKUs, and channel partners. No one person can address this issue
alone, so it's important that the message reaches a wide audience within the business. In the
Arthur D. Little white paper "Managing Complexity: How to Turn a Problem into a Strength,"
the authors describe a four stage framework for implementing organizational change. An
overview of the framework is shown in Figure 7-1.
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Figure 7-1: Four stages for addressing complexity, from Arthur D. Little3 9
The first stage involves understanding complexity in the business: its causes, magnitude, and
possible solutions. Developing a "complexity consciousness" is an important first step, and
arguably the most important part of the NACC project. In the second stage, organizational
alignment and buy-in are required. All business functions must not only understand the issue,
but also feel ownership for the problem and any future solutions. Stage three involves
managing the large scale change and getting people to alter their behaviors and work toward a
common, global optimum. Finally, in stage four, the effort is sustained and the organization
monitors key performance indicators (KPIs) to limit future complexity.40 This type of teach,
sell, implement, sustain approach sounds very straightforward, but the number of people
needed to make it work is a constant challenge for any business.
7.3 Leadership and Cross-Functional Support
From an implementation standpoint, there are two critical factors: a cross-functional task force
to drive the issue, and support from senior management to keep it visible across the business.
There is no handbook for complexity reduction, as each business faces a unique set of
challenges and circumstances. Therefore, the people in the organization must lead and sustain
the effort, and all business functions must be involved.
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Complexity is inherently an issue of trade-offs and understanding the effects of product line
decisions across the entire supply chain. According to Matthew Egol, a principal at Booz
Allen, & Hamilton "The companies that do well with customization often have well-developed
cross-functional teams... functions need to speak about how to reduce the complexity of the
system and how to cost-effectively add variety and increase focus regarding what variety to
add. The team is the focal point for making such trade-offs."4 1 C. Richard Paninco, president
of Integrated Product Management Company, Inc., agrees that companies need a cross-
functional team to determine "what to hold and what to fold" in managing product lines.4 2
Because the costs of complexity are sometimes due to local optimization within each business
function, a diverse team can achieve end-to-end visibility and work to find a global optimum.
Complexity reduction is significantly easier to understand than it is to implement. In a business
where variety drives differentiation and is a key customer need, SKU and channel
simplification involve a certain amount of risk. As part of the Operations Management
Roundtable on the subject of complexity reduction, participants were asked about these risks.
They mentioned three main concerns: lost revenue/contribution margin, damaged customer or
consumer relationships through failure to meet needs, and emotional impact on the company.4 3
Each of these is very real, which is why any efforts to reduce complexity must be supported
and driven by upper management. This is not simply a tactical problem that can be delegated
to a task force. The strategic implications are significant, and any decisions must be considered
within the context of business goals and objectives.
The OMR Roundtable discussion supports the importance of senior management involvement.
According to the report, all successful efforts of complexity reduction in their study have
involved active, vocal support at the executive level.44 With high level buy-in and cross-
functional implementation, a business can address both the strategic and tactical components of
complexity reduction.
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7.4 Results at NACC
At NACC, the complexity project included both cross-functional support and executive buy-in
as the team identified the importance for these elements at the earliest stage. In a business that
moves so rapidl y, the value of complexity discussions between members of different teams was
immediately obvious. Small details that seemed irrelevant to one person were very interesting
to another, and the exchange of data created a highly dynamic dialogue among team
participants. By interviewing people in each functional area and sharing the most interesting
stories with the whole team, energetic brainstorming sessions would result.
The project team presented results to senior management and their extended staff at several
milestone points throughout the project. Initially, there was some resistance from certain
individuals who felt that data were somewhat misleading and that the effort may have negative
consequences on a business that used variety a key basis of competition. In any cases where
the numbers were questioned, the team went back and revised estimates using the new
information provided in the presentations. The first half of the project was more of a "push"
effort, as the team tried to develop buy-in from the rest of the NACC organization. Once a full
cross-functional team was formed and the participants began to discuss the findings, a strong
"pull" for more information developed and the project really took hold.
By the end of the project, NACC staff identified several areas where they planned additional
investigations and/or changes to the business. In addition, key members of the product
marketing team were trained on the simplified complexity calculator (Figure 6-2) and told what
warning flags to look for in future proposed SKUs. At NACC's weekly, cross-functional staff
meeting, complexity was included in both strategic and tactical discussions. With a better
understanding of hidden costs, senior management could move into the next product cycle with
new information that will potentially help NACC to improve its competitive position in the
retail PC market.
NACC's Vice President and General Manager acknowledged the potential financial impact of
the analysis. After the conclusion of the project, he told the team how the findings and
recommendations would be used in his organization: "The process helped us generate the right
55
internal discussions to make trade-offs we knew were needed but had not been able to quantify.
As a result, we should reduce some SKUs from our plan and emphasize simplification in our
roadmap planning moving forward." In addition, NACC presented an "Outstanding
Collaboration Award" to the Design for Supply Chain and Procurement Risk Management
teams to recognize the contributions from this project.
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS
Complexity is fimdamentally an issue of balance: how an organization can offer value to its
customers through variety without paying too much and destroying profitability. Internal
communication barriers, external competition, fast sales cycles, retailer behavior, and
outsourcing all drive costs for NACC. Many of these costs are either spread evenly across all
products or hidden from the key decision makers. As the business works to increase
profitability while still satisfying customer requirements, the costs of complexity will become
an important input for strategic decisions.
The project involved multiple iterations of identifying, modeling, and validating NACC's
complexity-driven costs. In the end, the team created a suite of tools which will help the
business make better informed decisions, even if those decisions mean expanding the product
portfolio. The project identified specific products, retailers, and business practices that warrant
further investigation. The team established credibility through interviews and continual
refinement of its models, findings, and recommendations. NACC will face additional
challenges as competitors fight for market share, ODMs consolidate, and retailers continue to
demand variety at the lowest possible cost. By developing a "complexity conscience,"
however, senior management and group leaders will hopefully see each new product as a series
of tradeoffs and not just a vehicle for incremental revenue, profit, or market share.
Tackling complexity is a long and difficult process which can often contradict previous
,organizational processes. Identifying the complexity that customers are willing to pay for is
not easy, especially in a business that is rapidly commoditizing. Product innovation is one way
to address the complexity issue, but it's best used in conjunction with an informed portfolio
planning process. By identifying and eliminating the few products with expected negative
profitability, NACC can lower organizational workload, increase supply chain flexibility,
reduce product-related expenses, and improve its bottom line. Determining the full extent of
the benefits will come from trial and error, but the results from this study suggest significant
opportunity from NACC's future complexity reduction activities.
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APPENDIX A: DEFINITIONS
ABC Activity Based Costing: an internal accounting system used to allocate costs
based on the activities that drive them
Component A part used to build a personal computer; components include hard drives,
memory modules, central processing units, etc.
CV Coefficient of Variation: a statistical measure of variability, measured as:
Standard Deviation / Mean
Derivative PC A customer personal computer configuration that is specifically designed for
a single retailer
DfSC Design for Supply Chain: an HP internal consulting group that assists
product generation teams to trade-off responsiveness, material, and supply
chain costs in order to enhance customer service and maximize profitability
EOQ Economic Order Quantity: an optimized order quantity that minimizes the
inventory and transportation costs
FGI Finished Goods Inventory: the final assembled product that is either in
transport or held in a factory or distribution center
Frozen window The period prior to delivery when a customer can no longer change its order
IPSG Imaging and Personal Systems Group: a primary HP business group with
global responsibility for imaging, printing, and computing solutions
KPI Key Performance Indicator: a quantifiable measure of business performance;
a metric to monitor operations
Mainstream PC A personal computer configuration that is offered to all retailers for purchase
NACC North America Consumer Computing: a Hewlett-Packard business unit
responsible for consumer desktop and notebook computers in the United
States, Canada, and Mexico
NPI New Product Introduction: the process of manufacturing a new product and
ensuring proper quality before releasing it to the market
ODM Original Design Manufacturers: a contract manufacturer that produces
products for another company
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PC Personal Computer: a laptop or desktop computing device
PRM Procurement Risk Management: an HP internal consulting group that helps
businesses manage risk to lower material costs, increase component cost
predictability, improve assurance of supply and reduce shortages
Ramp The period at the start of a sales cycle when new products are mass produced
in the factory to fill the sales channel
ROCE Return on Capital Employed: a ratio that indicates efficiency of capital
investment, calculated as:
Earnings Before Interest and Taxes / (Total Assets - Current Liabilities)
Safety stock Inventory that is held specifically to buffer against increases in demand
Service level The percentage of requests for a particular item that can be filled from
existing inventory
SKU Stock Keeping Unit: an identifier used for inventory management; in the
context of this project, a SKU is defined as a personal computer
configuration sold through the retail channel
SPaM Strategic Planning and Modeling: an HP internal consulting group that helps
divisions improve data-driven decisions in the areas of supply chain,
forecasting and planning, warranty, and related fields
VCM Variable Contribution Margin: total revenue less total variable cost
NVOS Weeks of Supply: a dynamic measure of inventory levels based on future
forecasted demand
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APPENDIX B: FRAMEWORK INPUTS AND OUTPUTS
Pt-~ L~il~i :?cF~i!Spee ::  . : ::-···r:`-]
SOM;: · ·p: ··;
Rta .,· le rt ·:: ::
Pawttabattutofl
1t.00flflg
Inputs Outputs
':iProposed SKU names Total SKU count in PL A
Factory allocations Total SKU count in PL B
Unit selling price Total unit volume in PL A
Unit net revenue Total unit volume in PL B
Unit variable contribution margin
Expected lifetime volumes in PL A
Expected lifetime volumes in PL B
;i:!;:i Production leadtime (frozen window) Weekly unit variance by SKU
Forecast accuracy (CV) over leadtime as a function of lifetime volume
Weekly demand correlation
Pooled SKU correlation matrix for PL B
A ' (None) PL A total revenue
PL A total VCM
PL B total revenue
PL B total VCM
i Full portfolio parts list Unique part count
Part/SKU matrix
Part costs
Part inventory policies (weeks of stock)
Part leadtimes
. Retailer list Retailer SKU count
SKU/retailer matrix PL A price protected SKU count by retailer
SKU price protection PL B price protected SKU count by retailer
SKU classifcation (mainstream, derivative, etc.)
Supplier holding cost (annual percentage) PL A part holding costs (cycle and safety stock)
PL B part holding costs (cycle and safety stock)
t Stockout cost VCM multiplier PL A Type I & II part service levels
Weekly demand correlation PL A stockout costs
PL B Type I & 11 part service levels
PL B stockout costs
..;., Unused part salvage percentages PL A part excess costs
Overage probabilities PL B part excess costs
: Factory unit capacities (units/wk) PL A early production costs
NPI limitation (MRs/wk) PL A late production costs
Factory ramp slopes PL A depreciation and FGI holding costs
Optimal production weeks PL A total costs
Maximum pre-production weeks PL B early production costs
PC ASP PL B late production costs
FGI depreciation (%/wk) PL B depreciation and FGI holding costs
Competitive arly production charge ($/wk) PL B total costs
Postponed production charge
Organizational cost as a function of SKU count PL A organizational cost
PL B organizational cost
Pricing model returns and warranty allocations by ASP PL A cost deltas by SKU
Return rates by retailer (historical) PL A total costs
Accrual rates by retailer PL B cost deltas by SKU
Warranty expense by ASP (historical) PL B total costs
Fixed returns costs for standalone and bundle configurations
Lost value for returned monitors
:: EOL and PP as % of revenue by retailer (historical) PL A base marketing expense
Percent of total revenue by retailer (historical) Retailer effect marketing expense
Revenue effect of each added PP SKU (%) PL B base marketing expense
PL B complexity-adjusted marketing expense
- a (None) PL A inventory holding cost
PL A inventory underage cost
PL A inventory overage cost
PL A NPI cost
PL A unallocated marketing expense
PL A returns and warranty adjustment
PL A organizational cost
PL B inventory holding cost
PL B inventory underage cost
PL B inventory overage cost
PL B NPI cost
PL B unallocated marketing expense
PL B returns and warranty adjustment
PL B organizational cost
PL B complexity adjustment
PL B VCM adjusted for complexity effects
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